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 NOTE 
Missed the Mark: The Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s Faulty Application of Strict 
Scrutiny to the Right to Bear Arms  
State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) 
 
Abigail E. Williams* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of the scope and potential limitations of the Second 
Amendment has been at the forefront of the United States’s political debate in 
recent years.  Prior to 2008, Second Amendment jurisprudence was unclear as 
to what could constitute a lawful restriction of an individual’s right to bear 
arms.1  In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
affirmed the Second Amendment guarantee of the right to bear arms, holding 
that a Washington, D.C., law that prohibited possessing handguns in the home 
was unconstitutional.2  The Court further indicated that nothing in the opinion 
“should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”3  Two 
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the right to bear arms was fundamental and applied to the states.4  While Heller 
and McDonald made clear that the Second Amendment was a limited funda-
mental right, neither decision defined the applicable constitutional standard for 
analyzing laws restricting the right to bear arms.5 
In 2014, Missouri amended its constitution to include Amendment 5, a 
provision that requires the application of strict scrutiny to any law limiting the 
right to bear arms.6  In a sequence of cases, the last of which was State v. Clay, 
 
* B.A., University of Kansas, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like to thank 
Professor Rodney Uphoff for his guidance and suggestions, the editors of the Missouri 
Law Review for their time and assistance, my mom for her listening ear and feedback 
at the beginning of the writing process, and my husband for his unwavering support. 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 630. 
 3. Id. at 626–27. 
 4. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 5. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786. 
 6. Following the adoption of Amendment 5, article I, section 23 states: 
1
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the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section 571.070.1(1), a law that 
prohibited felons from possessing firearms, survived strict scrutiny.7  In so 
holding, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on the Heller dicta, even though 
the Heller Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard.8  This Note argues 
the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in its application of strict scrutiny.  While 
it is difficult to measure the efficacy of gun control laws, it is evident that cat-
egorically and permanently banning felons from possessing firearms is not the 
least restrictive means of achieving the government’s safety interest. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On January 26, 2015, Pierre Clay was stopped in St. Louis, Missouri, for 
a traffic violation and found possessing a revolver.9  The police discovered he 
had a prior felony conviction and arrested him.10  On February 25, 2015, Clay 
was charged by information with possession of marijuana under section 
195.202 and unlawful possession of a firearm under section 571.070.1(1).11  
Section 571.070.1(1) prohibits previously convicted felons from possessing 
firearms.12  Clay moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, claiming 
 
 
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and acces-
sories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, 
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil 
power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of con-
cealed weapons.  The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable.  
Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny and the 
state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall under 
no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement.  Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enact-
ing general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those 
adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result of a mental 
disorder or mental infirmity. 
 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (new language in bold, deleted language struck 
through). 
 7. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); State v. Merritt, 467 
S.W.3d 808, 816 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 
897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc). 
 8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 9. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 533. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 571.070.1(1), 195.202 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 12. Id. § 571.070.1(1).  The statute states: 
 
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person 
knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch person has 
been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the 
2
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that section 571.070.1(1) was unconstitutional under article I, section 23 of the 
Missouri Constitution, after Amendment 5 was added on August 5, 2014.13 
Clay claimed that article I, section 23, as amended, precluded the legisla-
ture from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons.14  He ar-
gued that the Missouri Constitution’s explicit authorization of the legislature 
to regulate the possession of firearms by violent felons should be read to pre-
clude the legislature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent 
felons.15  Further, Clay asserted that Amendment 5 substantially changed arti-
cle I, section 23.16  Therefore, he argued the precedent that deemed section 
571.070.1(1) constitutional under the pre-Amendment 5 version of article I, 
section 23 should not be applied to his case.17 
The circuit court granted Clay’s motion to dismiss the unlawful posses-
sion charge, determining that Amendment 5 barred the legislature from regu-
lating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons.18  The State appealed.19  
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Amendment 5 did not substantially 
alter article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, and, therefore, the 
court’s precedent which held that section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict scrutiny 
remained applicable to this case.20 
 
laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, 
would be a felony . . . . 
 
Id. 
 13. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 533.  Following the adoption of Amendment 5, article I, 
section 23 states: 
 
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and acces-
sories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, 
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil 
power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of con-
cealed weapons.  The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable.  
Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny and the 
state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall under 
no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement.  Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enact-
ing general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those 
adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result of a mental 
disorder or mental infirmity. 
 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (new language in bold, deleted language struck 
through). 
 14. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 534. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 536. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 533. 
 19. Id. at 532. 
 20. Id. at 538. 
3
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section 
571.070.1(1) was constitutional under the amended version of article I, section 
23 of the Missouri Constitution.21  The pertinent part of section 571.070.1(1) 
states: 
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such 
person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch 
person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of 
a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if 
committed within this state, would be a felony[.]22 
Following the adoption of Amendment 5,23 article I, section 23 of the Missouri 
Constitution states: 
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and 
accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense 
of his home, person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned 
in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not jus-
tify the wearing of concealed weapons.  The rights guaranteed by this 
section shall be unalienable.  Any restriction on these rights shall 
be subject to strict scrutiny[24] and the state of Missouri shall be 
obligated to uphold these rights and shall under no circumstances 
decline to protect against their infringement.  Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enact-
ing general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 533 (alterations in original) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) 
(Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
 23. Amendment 5 of article I, section 26 was adopted on August 5, 2014.  MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014). 
 24. Strict scrutiny is considered the “most rigorous and exacting standard of con-
stitutional review.”  Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).  If a classification is subject to 
strict scrutiny, the court must determine whether it is necessary to accomplish a com-
pelling state interest.  Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 
771, 774 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (per curiam).  See also State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 
892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 
(Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“[S]trict scrutiny is generally satisfied only if the 
law at issue is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.’” (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 197)).  If other, less restrictive, means can serve 
the compelling interest equally, the more restrictive means will be unnecessary and, 
therefore, unconstitutional.  Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 1443, 1465 (2009). 
4
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those adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result 
of a mental disorder or mental infirmity.25 
In reaching its decision in Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to bear arms in both Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, as well as recent 
Supreme Court of Missouri decisions interpreting these U.S. Supreme Court 
cases.  Accordingly, this Part examines the Supreme Court of Missouri’s inter-
pretation of article I, section 23 within the framework of McDonald and Heller.  
This Part concludes with a comparison of other states’ evaluations of firearm 
regulations post-Heller and McDonald to Missouri’s. 
A.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Right to Bear Arms 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined a 
District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home 
was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.26  In an opinion authored 
by Justice Scalia, the Court held, “The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition 
of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society 
for that lawful purpose.  The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where 
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”27  The Court 
did not apply a specific level of scrutiny, noting that “banning from the home 
‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of 
one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster” under any standard 
of scrutiny.28  More important for the problems confronted in Clay was the 
Heller Court’s dicta, which stated that nothing in the opinion “should be taken 
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sen-
 
 25. MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014) (emphasis added) (new language in 
bold, deleted language struck through). 
 26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).  The Second Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 
400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 28. Id. at 628–29 (citation omitted) (quoting Parker, 478 F.3d at 400).  In response 
to Justice Breyer’s dissent, the Court later rejected both rational basis scrutiny and in-
terest balancing.  Id. at 628 n.27, 634.  Thus, possible applicable constitutional stand-
ards include intermediate and strict scrutiny.  Intermediate scrutiny allows restrictions 
that are substantially related to important governmental interests.  Volokh, supra note 
24, at 1470.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 
(1989).  As addressed above, strict scrutiny allows restrictions that are narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling government interest.  McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467 
S.W.3d at 814. 
5
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sitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing con-
ditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”29  According to the 
Court, each of these regulations was “presumptively lawful.”30 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer admonished the majority for its deliberate 
silence regarding the proper constitutional standard to evaluate laws under the 
Second Amendment.31  The dissenting opinion explored some of the possible 
constitutional standards.32  First, Justice Breyer opined that a rational basis 
standard was inconsistent with the majority’s holding because the District of 
Columbia law undoubtedly bore “a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.’”33  Next, he determined that a strict scrutiny standard was 
also inconsistent with the majority’s holding.34  He asserted that the majority 
“implicitly, and appropriately,” rejected strict scrutiny by broadly approving a 
set of laws, including “forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right 
. . . whose constitutionality under a strict-scrutiny standard would be far from 
clear.”35  He not only determined that the majority’s dicta was inconsistent with 
strict scrutiny, but also that the adoption of a true strict scrutiny standard for 
evaluating firearm regulations would be practically impossible.36 
 
 29. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.  This dicta clearly departs from Scalia’s notorious 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution and may have been inserted specifically to 
secure a fifth vote to gain the majority.  See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of 
Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 420 (2009) (asserting that the language 
was “clearly tacked on to the opinion to secure a fifth vote (presumably Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s)”). 
 30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28, 628 n.27. 
 31. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 687–89.  
 33. Id. at 687–88 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).  According 
to Justice Breyer, the government’s interest was to save lives and prevent gun-related 
accidents.  Id.  He noted that the District of Columbia law at least bore a “‘rational 
relationship’ to that ‘legitimate’ life-saving objective.”  Id. at 688.  Responding to Jus-
tice Breyer’s dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that the District of Columbia law, like most 
laws, would survive rational basis scrutiny.  Id. at 628–29, 629 n.27 (majority opinion).  
He wrote, “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a 
rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitu-
tional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”  Id. at 629 n.27. 
 34. Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 688. 
 36. Id. at 689.  He noted that every gun-control regulation will seek to advance a 
compelling government interest – a concern for the safety and the lives of its citizens.  
Id.  Therefore, “any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in 
practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Se-
cond Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the 
other.”  Id.  Ultimately, Justice Breyer concluded that the Court should adopt this inter-
est-balancing inquiry explicitly.  Id. 
6
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Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, petitioners filed suit 
against the city, alleging that its handgun ban violated the Second and Four-
teenth Amendments.37  Relying on the Heller decision, the McDonald Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates to the states the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms for self-defense against the several states and 
any city therein.38  The Court determined that the Heller decision indicated the 
right to bear arms was “fundamental” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory and tradition” and was therefore incorporated in the concept of due pro-
cess.39  Like in Heller, the Court did not define a specific constitutional stand-
ard to evaluate laws limiting the right to bear arms.40  Further, McDonald af-
firmed the Heller dicta regarding the presumed lawfulness of certain regula-
tions, noting that “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating fire-
arms.”41 
B.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Reliance on the Heller and 
McDonald Precedent 
State v. Clay was preceded by four different Supreme Court of Missouri 
decisions that relied on Heller and McDonald.42  First, State v. Richard was 
decided after Heller but before McDonald.43  In Richard, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri determined that a law which forbade the possession or discharge 
of a firearm while intoxicated was constitutional under article I, section 23 of 
the Missouri Constitution.44  The Supreme Court of Missouri did not define a 
specific constitutional standard but merely noted that the legislature was af-
forded “wide discretion to exercise its police power,” and “[p]ossession of a 
loaded firearm by an intoxicated individual poses a demonstrated threat to pub-
lic safety.”45 
 
 37. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 767. 
 39. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).  The Court 
did not indicate that strict scrutiny must be applied for laws challenged under a provi-
sion that includes a fundamental right.  Id. at 768.  The Court discussed whether the 
right to keep and bear arms is fundamental solely for the purpose of determining 
whether the right is incorporated in the concept of due process.  Id. at 767. 
 40. Id. at 767. 
 41. Id. at 786. 
 42. See supra note 7. 
 43. State v. Richard, 298 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 44. Id. at 531–33.  This was decided under the pre-Amendment 5 version of article 
I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, which provided as follows: “That the right 
of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or 
when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this 
shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons.”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 
2014). 
 45. Richard, 298 S.W.3d at 532. 
7
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Fischer wrote that the Second Amend-
ment was a fundamental right that applied to the states, “even though the 
United States Supreme Court ha[d] yet to make that declaration.”46  Despite his 
declaration that the right to bear arms was “fundamental,” Judge Fischer did 
not declare strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard that should apply when 
evaluating restrictions on the Second Amendment.47  Instead, he alluded to the 
Heller Court’s dicta and wrote that “reasonable limitations on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill and laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings,” were 
constitutional.48 
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not decide another right to bear arms 
case until 2015, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s McDonald decision.49  In Dot-
son v. Kander, the plaintiffs argued that the ballot title for Amendment 5 of 
article I, section 23 was legally insufficient because it omitted any description 
of the language concerning strict scrutiny and failed to inform the voter that 
the amendment substantially changed the laws regulating the right to bear 
arms.50  In Dotson, the court determined that Amendment 5 “did not change 
the law affecting the right to bear arms but established a broader guideline in-
dicating how laws affecting the right to bear arms should be scrutinized.”51  
According to the Dotson court, after McDonald, the strict scrutiny standard 
was applicable to restrictions on the right to bear arms, even before the passage 
of Amendment 5.52 
The Dotson court determined that the McDonald Court’s holding that the 
right to bear arms was fundamental meant that strict scrutiny should be applied 
to any law challenged under article I, section 23.53  In so holding, the Dotson 
court relied on Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Services, Inc., in which 
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that fundamental rights, such as “the rights 
to free speech, to vote, [and] to freedom of interstate travel,” are subject to 
strict scrutiny.54  The Etling court defined the strict scrutiny standard as requir-
ing a law to be “necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.”55  While 
this definition of strict scrutiny differs from the traditional definition used by 
 
 46. Id. at 533 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 534. 
 49. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 50. Id. at 196. 
 51. Id. at 197. 
 52. Id. at 197 n.5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 55. Id. 
8
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the U.S. Supreme Court,56 the Supreme Court of Missouri seems to use these 
two different articulations of the test interchangeably.  The court later defined 
strict scrutiny as the determination of whether a law is “narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest.”57 
The two Dotson concurring opinions shed further light on the possible 
impact of Amendment 5.58  Judge Fischer noted that the purpose of the amend-
ment was “not to change the law but to make sure the Missouri Constitution is 
at least as protective as the Supreme Court of the United States has declared 
the law of the right to bear arms is under the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”59  Judge Stith asserted that, within the meaning of 
Amendment 5, strict scrutiny does not require “utilization of a technical legal 
standard that even the United States Supreme Court does not apply to regula-
tion of the Second Amendment.”60  She further avowed that adoption of the 
technical definition of “strict scrutiny” would “impinge on the judicial province 
and so raise serious separation of powers issues.”61 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State v. McCoy and 
State v. Merritt.62  These were companion cases decided on the same day, as 
both challenged the constitutionality of section 571.070.1(1) under article I, 
section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.63  The court in McCoy and Merritt 
determined that the amended version of article I, section 23 was not applicable 
because the amendment was not yet in effect at the time of the offenses.64  The 
court held that, according to the Dotson decision, strict scrutiny applied under 
 
 56. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (defining 
the use of strict scrutiny as reviewing a law with care to determine whether it is “nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest” (quoting Abrams v. 
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997))). 
 57. See State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(noting that strict scrutiny is only satisfied if the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling government interest); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (same). 
 58. Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 200–05 (Fischer, J., concurring); id. at 205–15 (Stith, 
J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 200 (Fischer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 209 (Stith, J., concurring).  It should also be noted that Judge Teitelman 
authored an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in the separate opinion 
filed in which he determined that Amendment 5 did substantially alter article I, section 
23, and the summary statement on the ballot failed to reflect these changes.  Id. at 215–
21 (Teitelman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part in separate opinion filed). 
 61. Id. at 209 (Stith, J., concurring). 
 62. State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. 
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 63. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 894; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 810. 
 64. See McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895; see also Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812.  The 
court wrote, “The amended version of article I, section 23 does not have any text that 
suggests it was intended to be applied retroactively.  Therefore, it applies prospectively 
only.”  Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812.  See also McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895 (citing State 
ex rel. Hall v. Vaughn, 483 S.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Mo. 1972) (en banc)). 
9
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both the amended and previous versions of article I, section 23.65  The court 
determined that section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict scrutiny because it was 
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”66 
The court in Merritt and McCoy relied on a Third Circuit case that deter-
mined “[i]t is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent 
crimes than are other law abiding citizens.”67  Further, the court quoted a Sev-
enth Circuit case in which the court determined that “someone with a felony 
conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and 
violent gun use.”68  However, neither the Third Circuit nor the Seventh Circuit 
implied that a law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was narrowly 
tailored to the government’s interest in public safety.69  Instead, both courts 
relied on Heller and upheld the federal law that prohibited firearm possession 
by felons without defining a level of scrutiny.70  Despite this discrepancy be-
tween the instant case and the situation in the Third and Seventh Circuits, the 
court in Merritt and McCoy concluded, “The felon-in-possession law, which 
bans felons from possessing firearms, with no exceptions other than possessing 
an antique firearm, is sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
interest of protecting the public from firearm-related crime.  Therefore, it 
passes strict scrutiny.”71 
C.  Other States’ Reliance on the Heller and McDonald Precedent 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of the Heller and 
McDonald decisions addressed above differs from that of its counterparts in 
other states.  In Dotson and its progeny, the Supreme Court of Missouri referred 
to State v. Eberhardt, a 2014 Louisiana Supreme Court case.72  Like Missouri, 
Louisiana had recently amended the right to bear arms provision of its consti-
tution to include a strict scrutiny requirement.73  In Eberhardt, the Louisiana 
 
 65. See McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812. 
 66. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814. 
 67. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011)); Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Barton, 
633 F.3d at 175). 
 68. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897–98 (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 
681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)); Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Yancey, 
621 F.3d at 685). 
 69. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685. 
 70. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685. 
 71. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 816.  In his concurring 
opinion, Judge Draper disagreed that strict scrutiny must be applied to any right to bear 
arms brought under article I, section 23 as it was written prior to Amendment 5.  
McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 899 (Draper, J., concurring); Merritt, 468 S.W.3d at 816 
(Draper, J., concurring). 
 72. See Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197–98 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 73. The amended version of article I, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution 
states: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not 
10
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Supreme Court upheld a statute that made it unlawful for “any person who has 
been convicted of a crime of violence . . . to possess a firearm or carry a con-
cealed weapon.”74  This statute significantly differs from Missouri’s section 
571.070.1(1).75  Not only does the Louisiana law limit criminalization to gun-
possessing felons convicted of specific violent crimes, but it also does not crim-
inalize gun possession by “any person who has not been convicted of any fel-
ony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, 
parole, or suspension of sentence.”76  The Louisiana Supreme Court deter-
mined that the statute survived strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling government interest of public safety.77  In holding that 
the law is narrowly tailored, the court noted that it only applies to the violent 
felonies enumerated in the statute, and it does not apply to individuals who 
have not been convicted of a felony in the past ten years.78 
Missouri and Louisiana are outliers in that their constitutions were 
amended to explicitly require the application of strict scrutiny.79  Further, both 
the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that, 
absent their constitutional amendments, strict scrutiny would still have been 
 
be infringed, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the 
carrying of weapons concealed on the person.  Any restriction on this right shall be 
subject to strict scrutiny.”  LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2012) (new language in 
bold, deleted language struck through). 
 74. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1(A) (2017).  The statute further defines which 
“crimes of violence” were included within the statute: 
 
a felony or simple burglary, burglary of a pharmacy, burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling, unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, felony illegal use of 
weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, manufacture or possession of a de-
layed action incendiary device, manufacture or possession of a bomb, or pos-
session of a firearm while in the possession of or during the sale or distribution 
of a controlled dangerous substance, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled 
Dangerous Substances Law which is a felony, or any crime which is defined as 
a sex offense in R.S. 15:541, or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one 
of the above-enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been 
convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any 
foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, 
would be one of the above-enumerated crimes . . . . 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 76. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 382 (La. 2014) (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:95.1(C)). 
 77. Id. at 385. 
 78. Id. 
 79. State Strict Scrutiny Ballot Initiatives, EVERYTOWN (July 9, 2015), https://eve-
rytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-strict-scrutiny/.  Missouri, Louisiana, and Alabama are 
the only three states to have adopted a strict scrutiny requirement for the right to bear 
arms.  Id.  The Alabama amendment was approved in November 2014.  Id. 
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the applicable constitutional test for laws that limited the right to bear arms.80  
Conversely, other state courts held that, in light of Heller and McDonald, strict 
scrutiny is not the applicable test.81  Thus, the Supreme Court of Missouri is an 
outlier in both its interpretation of Heller and McDonald and its application of 
strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms.  Missouri is the only state that has uti-
lized strict scrutiny in a right to bear arms context and still upheld a law that 
permanently bans all felons from possessing firearms. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In State v. Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Amendment 5 
did not substantially alter article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, and, 
therefore, the court’s precedent that held section 571.070.1(1) satisfied strict 
scrutiny remained applicable to this case.82  In so holding, the court first deter-
mined that the pre-Amendment 5 version of article I, section 23 permitted reg-
ulation of firearm possession by felons.83  The court relied on its recent inter-
pretation of the previous version of article I, section 23 in Merritt and McCoy.84  
According to the court, Merritt and McCoy held that, because Heller and 
McDonald recognized that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, strict 
scrutiny should be used in analyzing the constitutionality of any regulation of 
that right.85  The Supreme Court of Missouri did not define the exact strict 
scrutiny test in Merritt, McCoy, or Clay.86  But, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
 
 80. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 n.5 (en banc) (per curiam); Eberhardt, 
145 So. 3d at 383. 
 81. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing that 
neither Heller nor McDonald applied a particular level of scrutiny, but determining that 
felons convicted of violent crimes should be categorically excluded from protection 
under the Second Amendment); City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 
648 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a California state law that “authorizes the seizure 
and possible forfeiture of weapons belonging to persons detained for examination . . . 
because of their mental condition” did not violate the Second Amendment); Rocky 
Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 371 P.3d 768, 770, ¶ 2 (Colo. App. 2016) 
(noting that neither Heller nor McDonald determined a level of scrutiny for the right to 
bear arms and finding a state law which “banned the sale, possession, and transfer of 
‘large-capacity ammunition magazines’” constitutional). 
 82. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 83. Id. at 534. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., id.  The court in Clay stated: 
 
While most commonly courts apply strict scrutiny by determining whether a 
law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, in other cases, 
depending on the extent the regulation burdens a particular right, the courts look 
to whether a regulation imposes “reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions” 
that serve “the State’s important regulatory interests” or whether the encroach-
ment is “significant.” 
12
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held that the section 571.070.1(1) restriction on the possession of weapons by 
felons survived “even the most stringent formulation of the strict scrutiny 
standard in that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”87  
According to the court, the State has a “compelling governmental interest in 
‘ensuring public safety and reducing firearm-related crime[,] . . . [and] [p]ro-
hibiting felons from possessing firearms is narrowly tailored to that interest 
because ‘[i]t is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent 
crimes than are other law abiding citizens.’”88  In concluding that section 
571.070.1(1) was “narrowly tailored,” the court relied on two federal appellate 
court cases, United States v. Barton and United States v. Yancey, both of which 
stated that felons are more likely than non-felons to commit violent crimes.89 
Next, the court held that Amendment 5 did not substantially change arti-
cle I, section 23, and, therefore, the Merritt and McCoy strict scrutiny analysis 
discussed above applied to the instant case.90  The court relied on its holding 
in Dotson, which determined that Amendment 5 merely set out “a declaration 
of the law as it would have been declared by this Court after McDonald man-
dated that the fundamental right to bear arms applied to the states.”91  The court 
ultimately determined that Amendment 5 “sets out the standard of scrutiny for 
regulation of arms possessed by persons other than convicted violent felons 
and persons with certain mental disorders or infirmities – such regulations may 
be adopted but will be subject to strict scrutiny.”92  Thus, the court held that 
section 571.070.1(1) was constitutional under article I, section 23 of the Mis-
souri Constitution.93 
In his dissent, Judge Teitelman wrote that section 571.070.1(1) should not 
have been found constitutional under article I, section 23 of the Missouri Con-
stitution.94  While he agreed with the majority’s analysis that strict scrutiny 
applied in determining the constitutionality of section 571.070.1(1) both before 
and after the adoption of Amendment 5, he determined that “[t]he categorical 
and permanent restrictions” of section 571.070.1(1) were “too broad to survive 
strict scrutiny.”95  He asserted that the State did not sufficiently demonstrate 
 
 
Id. at 535 (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)). 
 87. Id. (citing State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per 
curiam); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
 88. Id. at 535–36 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting 
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814). 
 89. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897 (citing United States 
v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 
684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). 
 90. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536. 
 91. Id. (quoting Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 n.5 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(per curiam)). 
 92. Id. at 537. 
 93. Id. at 538. 
 94. Id. at 539 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. 
13
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that “categorically and permanently restricting the fundamental constitutional 
right of nonviolent felons is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state inter-
est in public safety.”96 
Ultimately, Judge Teitelman provided three deficiencies in the argument 
that permanently abrogating the constitutional rights of nonviolent felons to 
keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and their families is narrowly 
tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest of public safety.97  First, he 
asserted that the studies and data offered by the State do not demonstrate that 
permanently banning convicted nonviolent felons from possessing a firearm 
will ameliorate any gun crime.98  He noted that the studies provided by the 
State failed to differentiate between the rates and types of gun crimes commit-
ted by those with no prior convictions relative to individuals with prior nonvi-
olent or violent convictions.99  Second, he indicated that the majority opinion 
failed to properly consider that the number of nonviolent felons is growing.100  
Finally, he argued that the Louisiana statute at issue in State v. Eberhardt is 
“radically different” than section 571.070.1(1).101  According to Judge Teitel-
man, unlike section 571.070.1(1), the Louisiana statute was narrowly tailored 
because it only banned possession of firearms by dangerous felons,102 and the 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  He opined: 
 
The State does not show that any of the studies or articles separately analyzed 
obvious variables such as the number and nature of the prior offenses, the num-
ber and nature of subsequent offenses, the age of the offenders, or the lapse of 
time between offenses.  The lack of analysis of different variables renders it 
impossible to determine the relative propensity of convicted nonviolent felons 
to commit gun crimes.  Without this information, it is impossible to determine 
whether restricting the rights of nonviolent felons is actually narrowly tailored 
to achieve the goal of public safety. 
 
Id. at 539–40. 
 100. Id. at 539–40.  He wrote: 
 
While it is beyond dispute that murderers, rapists and others who commit vio-
lent or dangerous felonies have amply demonstrated the inability to abide by 
the responsibilities entailed by the right . . . to bear arms, that conclusion be-
comes considerably less certain and, in some cases, counterintuitive when one 
considers the broad and ever-expanding array of nonviolent felonies. 
 
Id. at 540–41. 
 101. Id. at 541. 
 102. Dangerous felons include only those who have been convicted of enumerated 
felonies “determined by the legislature to be offenses having the actual or potential 
danger of harm to other members of the general public.”  State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 
3d 377, 385 (La. 2014). 
14
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ban was not permanent but lasted ten years following completion of the sen-
tence.103 
V.  COMMENT 
As demonstrated above, neither Heller nor McDonald declared a specific 
level of scrutiny for determining the constitutionality of laws that limit the right 
to bear arms.104  By requiring strict scrutiny, Missouri actually expanded the 
protection of the right to bear arms beyond the realm of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald.  Judge Fischer alluded to this ex-
pansion in his concurring opinion in Dotson v. Kander.105  He noted that the 
purpose of Amendment 5 to article I, section 26 was “to make sure the Missouri 
Constitution is at least as protective as the Supreme Court of the United States 
has declared the law of the right to bear arms is under the Second Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.”106 
Prior to Merritt and McCoy, neither Missouri nor the federal government 
had ever applied strict scrutiny to restrictions on the right to bear arms.107  Thus, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Dotson and its progeny, ultimately defined 
Missouri’s standard.108  First, this Part will address the weaknesses in the Su-
preme Court of Missouri’s definition and application of strict scrutiny.  Specif-
ically, it will assert that section 571.070.1(1), while consistent with the Heller 
dicta, cannot survive under a strict scrutiny standard.  Next, this Part will rec-
ognize the inherent difficulties in applying strict scrutiny to the right to bear 
arms, as well as the rationales behind and implications of the court’s use of 
strict scrutiny in Clay.  Ultimately, this Part will conclude that the Supreme 
Court of Missouri failed to exercise the level of scrutiny required by the Mis-
souri people and their constitution. 
A.  Section 571.070.1(1) Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny 
While the Supreme Court of Missouri’s language is consistent with the 
strict scrutiny standard, its limited analysis fails to convincingly demonstrate 
that section 571.070.1(1) actually meets this high constitutional bar.  Neither 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (determining 
that the District of Columbia law is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny” that the Court has applied to enumerated rights).  See also McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (holding that the right to bear arms is fundamental 
and applies to states). 
 105. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 202 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Fischer, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. See id. (“Strict scrutiny has no settled meaning as applied to the right to bear 
arms, which the Supreme Court of the United States has declared a ‘[ ]limited’ funda-
mental right.” (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626)). 
 108. See id. at 197. 
15
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the Heller nor McDonald Courts applied a specific level of scrutiny to the right 
to bear arms.109  Nevertheless, in its strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri relied on the Heller dicta, which determined that laws prohibiting 
possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful.110  Despite the Su-
preme Court of Missouri’s assumption, the Heller Court’s declaration that pro-
hibitions of firearm possession by felons are presumed lawful does not mean 
that they are presumed lawful under the strict scrutiny standard. 
The Clay court erred in using the more lenient constitutional standard em-
ployed by the U.S. Supreme Court to justify its upholding of section 
571.070.1(1).  In Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri expressed the position 
that, in order to satisfy strict scrutiny, a law does not necessarily have to be 
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”111  To justify its po-
sition, the Supreme Court of Missouri referred to the language used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in both Heller and Burdick v. Takushi.112  But neither the Heller 
nor Burdick Courts applied a strict scrutiny test.113  As noted above, the Heller 
Court deliberately did not define a specific standard of scrutiny.114  The Bur-
dick Court expressly rejected strict scrutiny, determining that “a more flexible 
standard” applied.115  This more lenient standard, quoted in the Clay opinion, 
asked whether a regulation imposed “reasonable, nondiscriminatory re-
strictions” that served “the State’s important regulatory interests” or whether 
the encroachment was “significant.”116  Because neither the Heller Court nor 
the Burdick Court actually applied strict scrutiny, the Clay court erred in using 
these Courts’ analyses to justify its conclusion that, to satisfy strict scrutiny, a 
law does not necessarily have to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state interest. 
 
 109. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (determining that the District of Columbia law 
is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny” that the Court has applied 
to enumerated rights).  See also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (holding that the right to 
bear arms is fundamental and applies to states). 
 110. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (citing Heller, 554 
U.S. at 626–27). 
 111. Id.  The court opined: 
 
While most commonly courts apply strict scrutiny by determining whether a 
law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, in other cases, 
. . . the courts look to whether a regulation imposes “reasonable, non-discrimi-
natory restrictions” that serve “the State’s important regulatory interests” or 
whether the encroachment is “significant.” 
 
Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)). 
 112. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 
(1992)). 
 113. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428. 
 114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 115. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428. 
 116. Id.; Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 535. 
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A categorical restriction on the possession of firearms by felons cannot 
survive strict scrutiny.117  Strict scrutiny is the “most rigorous and exacting 
standard of constitutional review.”118  To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be 
the “least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”119  The 
standard can also be stated as requiring the law to be “narrowly tailored” or 
“necessary” to promote the state’s “compelling interest.”120  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri used the language of this standard but failed to accurately 
apply the test.121 
Despite the Clay court’s expression that a law need not be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling government interest to survive strict scrutiny, the 
court nevertheless relied on the Merritt and McCoy opinions to conclude that 
section 571.070.1(1) survived strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.122  In Merritt and McCoy, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri held that section 571.070.1(1) survived strict scrutiny 
because the state had “a compelling interest in ensuring public safety and re-
ducing firearm-related crime.”123  In reaching the conclusion that prohibiting 
felons from possessing firearms was narrowly tailored, the court relied on two 
federal appellate cases, United States v. Barton124 and United States v. 
Yancey.125  These cases opined that it was “well-established that felons are 
more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law abiding citizens,” and 
 
 117. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Specula-
tions About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009) [hereinafter 
Tushnet, After Heller] (determining that a ban on possession of firearms by felons 
would not survive strict scrutiny because it is “almost certainly overbroad”). 
 118. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).  See also Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This most exacting 
standard ‘has proven automatically fatal’ in almost every case.” (quoting Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 119. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (citing United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). 
 120. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that strict scrutiny 
requires a law to be “narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”).  
See also Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc) (per curiam) (stating that strict scrutiny requires a law to be “necessary 
to accomplish a compelling state interest”). 
 121. Post-Heller, Tushnet predicted that lower courts would uphold regulations 
“reasonably analogous to the longstanding ones that the Court in Heller purported to 
leave untouched” under what the courts would call “strict scrutiny,” though the test 
actually applied will be a more lenient standard.  Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117, 
at 1428 n.13. 
 122. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 123. State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State 
v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).  
 124. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled by 
Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 125. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
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“someone with a felony conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon 
to engage in illegal and violent gun use.”126 
These appellate court cases are easily distinguished from Merritt, McCoy, 
and Clay and do not support a holding that section 571.070.1(1) survives the 
narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny standard.  Most notably, the ap-
pellate courts followed Heller and did not apply a specific level of scrutiny.127  
The Barton court relied on the Heller Court’s statement that laws prohibiting 
felons from possessing firearms are “presumptively lawful” and concluded that 
this restriction was “entirely consistent with the purpose of the Second Amend-
ment to maintain ‘the security of a free State.’”128  In Yancey, the court asked 
whether the government had made a “strong showing” that the challenged law 
was “substantially related to an important governmental objective.”129  Nothing 
in either opinion supported a conclusion that a right to bear arms restriction 
would survive under the strict scrutiny test.130  Indeed, the Yancey court implied 
the possibility that, under a more stringent standard, a law prohibiting felons 
from possessing firearms would not survive.131  The court stated, “[W]hile 
felon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‘wildly overinclusive’ for en-
compassing nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to con-
sider the propriety of disarming felons under analogous state constitutional 
provisions has concluded that step to be permissible.”132  Although such limi-
tations have been found to be permissible under standards such as those per-
formed by the Yancey and Barton courts, it seems highly unlikely that a “wildly 
overinclusive” law would survive strict scrutiny. 
While it might be true that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes 
than non-felons, this fails to demonstrate how a law prohibiting felons from 
possessing firearms is narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to pro-
mote the government’s interest.  For instance, it is also true that both men and 
individuals aged fifteen to twenty-four are, in general, more likely than the 
general population to commit violent crimes.133  But, this does not justify re-
stricting these classes’ right to bear arms, especially when the restriction is 
evaluated under strict scrutiny.  A restriction of firearm possession by felons 
can be easily narrowed to achieve the interests of safety and reduction of vio-
lent crime.  Most obviously, the class of all felons could be narrowed to a class 
 
 126. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897; Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (first quoting Barton, 
633 F.3d at 175; and then quoting Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685). 
 127. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683. 
 128. Barton, 633 F.3d at 175 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II). 
 129. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683. 
 130. Id.; Barton, 633 F.3d at 175. 
 131. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683. 
 132. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amend-
ment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 721 (2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing]). 
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of individuals who are even more likely to commit violent crimes with firearms 
– violent felons. 
A general ban on the possession of firearms by all felons simply is not the 
least restrictive means to promote the government’s interest of public safety.  
A ban on the possession of firearms by felons is almost certainly overbroad.134  
There is not much evidence that indicates a convicted felon is more likely to 
engage in unlawful acts with a gun than a non-felon.135  Indeed, to support the 
proposition that it is “well-established that felons are more likely to commit 
violent crimes than are other law abiding citizens,” the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri merely cited to the Barton and Yancey decisions, neither of which pro-
vided strong evidence to support this assertion.136  In Barton, the Third Circuit 
cited to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which found that within a population 
of 234,358 federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrest for homicides 
were fifty-three times the national average.137  This study is clearly outdated 
and imprecise.138  In Yancey, the court specified that the “evidence of historical 
precedent for prohibiting criminals from carrying arms” is frequently debated 
by scholars.139  The court cited to  Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, in which Carlton F.W. 
Larson asserts that prohibiting the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons 
does not seem to serve the government’s interest in public safety.140  He writes, 
“Why would we think that a tax evader, an embezzler, or someone who bribed 
a public official would be more likely to commit acts of gun violence?”141  Lar-
son also notes that laws permanently banning the possession of firearms by all 
felons are also overbroad with respect to violent felons.142  He asserts, “Is it at 
all realistic to think, say, that a ninety-two year old man, confined to a wheel-
chair, who committed an armed burglary in his early twenties and was released 
from prison over sixty years ago, poses a realistic threat of unlawful gun vio-
lence?”143  Nevertheless, the court in Yancey concluded that the right to bear 
 
 134. Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117, at 1429. 
 135. Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1380 (2009) (“[T]he 
fit between being a convicted felon and being someone who is likely to engage in un-
lawful acts with a gun, although far from irrational, is not especially tight.”). 
 136. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535–36 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (quoting State v. 
Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
 137. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled by 
Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. 
 139. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 140. Larson, supra note 135, at 1381. 
 141. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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arms is “tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry,” and therefore, the govern-
ment can disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”144  While the Barton and Yancey courts 
held that these findings were sufficient to allow the laws to pass muster under 
a lower level of scrutiny, these findings do not indicate that a permanent ban 
of the possession of firearms by all felons is narrowly tailored. 
Judge Teitelman expressed  similar views in his dissent.145  He opined 
that the State failed to present adequate evidence distinguishing between the 
rate and types of gun crimes committed by those with no prior convictions rel-
ative to individuals with prior or violent convictions.146  Further, he suggested 
that section 571.070.1(1) could be more narrowly tailored by limiting the 
length of time for which the prohibition applies to a specific felon.147  Judge 
Teitelman concluded that the “categorical and permanent restrictions that sec-
tion 571.070.1 places on the exercise of this fundamental right are too broad to 
survive strict scrutiny.”148 
While the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on State v. Eberhardt, a Lou-
isiana case, to justify its upholding of section 571.070.1(1), this case is inap-
posite to Clay.149  In fact, the Louisiana law at issue in Eberhardt exemplifies 
how section 571.070.1(1) could have easily been more narrowly tailored and 
less restrictive.150  The Louisiana law was not a categorical or permanent ban 
on the possession of firearms for felons, which enabled the Louisiana Supreme 
Court to determine that the State met its burden in satisfying strict scrutiny.151  
The Eberhardt court determined 
the law is narrowly tailored in its application to the possession of fire-
arms or the carrying of concealed weapons for a period of only ten years 
from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspen-
sion of sentence, and to only those convicted of the enumerated felonies 
determined by the legislature to be offenses having the actual or poten-
tial danger of harm to other members of the general public.152 
Conversely, section 571.070.1(1) permanently bans all felons from possessing 
firearms and does not differentiate between violent and nonviolent felons.153  
 
 144. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(quoting United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 145. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (Teitelman, J., dis-
senting). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 541. 
 150. Id. 
 151. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 379 (La. 2014). 
 152. Id. at 385. 
 153. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  The statute states: 
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Eberhardt does not justify upholding section 571.070.1(1).  To the contrary, 
the Louisiana statute demonstrates how section 571.070.1(1) could be more 
narrowly tailored.154 
B.  Difficulties in Application of Strict Scrutiny to the Right to Bear 
Arms 
As suggested in Judge Teitelman’s dissent, and as demonstrated by the 
statute at issue in State v. Eberhardt, there are many ways that section 
517.070.1(1) could have been more narrowly tailored.155  However, it is inher-
ently challenging to assess the efficacy of gun control laws, and as a result, it 
is difficult for the government to meet its burden under a true strict scrutiny 
standard.156  In its response to Judge Teitelman’s dissent, the Clay majority 
alluded to the difficulty in applying strict scrutiny to the right to bear arms.157  
The court rejected any suggestion that, “for the law to survive strict scrutiny,” 
the court must “in each case de novo reconsider and itself evaluate the strength 
of studies about the use of weapons by felons before it can determine whether 
restrictions on the right of felons to bear arms are sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored.”158  The court indicated that if the State were required to present con-
vincing studies demonstrating that restricting felons from possessing firearms 
actually improved public safety, it would struggle to meet its burden.159 
It is, of course, inherently difficult to ascertain whether gun control laws 
actually improve public safety.160  Demonstrating that a gun control law is nar-
rowly tailored requires one to predict “(1) the possible decrease in injury and 
 
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person 
knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and . . . [s]uch person has 
been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the 
laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, 
would be a felony. 
 
Id. 
 154. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2017). 
 155. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 539 (Teitelman, J., dissenting); Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d at 
382. 
 156. See, e.g., Tushnet, After Heller, supra note 117, at 1427 (“[I]n general, it is 
quite difficult to show with any moderately persuasive social-science evidence that dis-
crete and moderate gun regulations – what political candidates and public opinion sur-
veys refer to as reasonable gun regulations – do much if anything to advance public 
policies favoring reduction in violence, reduction in gun violence, reduction in acci-
dents associated with guns, or pretty much anything else the public thinks the regula-
tions might accomplish.”); Volokh, supra note 24, at 1465 (“The difficulty is that we 
often won’t know if the proposed law is really necessary to reduce various dangers.  
And this is especially true as to the right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 157. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536 n.5. 
 158. Id. at 536. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1465. 
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crime stemming from the controls and (2) the possible increase in injury and 
crime stemming from the interference with lawful self-defense.”161  These are 
both difficult, if not impossible, to project and calculate.162  But, the nature of 
the strict scrutiny test requires some level of evidence and analysis demonstrat-
ing that the law is narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to promote 
the government’s interest.163  In fact, both the Supreme Court of Missouri and 
the U.S. Supreme Court have required this showing when they have applied 
strict scrutiny to other various rights.164 
In State v. Clay, the court erred in failing to recognize that the State did 
not satisfy this burden.  In determining whether section 571.070.1(1) was nar-
rowly tailored, the court merely cited to Barton, noting that “[i]t is well-estab-
lished that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., id. (“Gun control proponents argue that only banning guns, or re-
moving guns from certain places, or limiting guns in other ways will prevent certain 
kinds of crimes.  And they suggest that lawful self-defense isn’t really that effective, or 
that it won’t be much interfered with by the proposals . . . . Gun control opponents argue 
that the gun restrictions largely won’t disarm those who misuse guns, since the misusers 
are criminals who won’t comply with gun laws any more than they comply with laws 
banning robbery, rape, or murder.  And they argue that any possible slight decline in 
injuries caused by people who do comply with gun laws, or in accidental injuries or in 
suicides . . . will be more than offset by the increase in crime and injury stemming from 
lost opportunities for effective self-defense.” (footnote omitted)).  For a more compre-
hensive version of this debate, see Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDon-
ald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011). 
 163. Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 162, at 438–39. 
 164. See, e.g., In re Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (determin-
ing that a law which required secure confinement of sexually violent predators was 
narrowly tailored because the state “erect[ed] an elaborate, step-by-step procedure, con-
ferring on the suspected predator a number of rights enjoyed by defendants in criminal 
prosecutions” and mandated annual court examinations to “determine if the person’s 
mental abnormality has improved with treatment and if the individual remains likely to 
engage in violent sexual acts if released”), modified (Jan. 27, 2004); Weinschenk v. 
State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that provision requiring 
photo identification to vote was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state in-
terest in preventing voter fraud because “[n]o evidence was presented that voter imper-
sonation fraud exists to any substantial degree in Missouri.  In fact, the evidence that 
was presented indicates that voter impersonation fraud is not a problem in Missouri”).  
See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (holding that a law requir-
ing a female member of the uniformed services to prove dependency in fact to receive 
benefits for her spouse, where no such burden was imposed upon male members, re-
quired the government to demonstrate concrete evidence that “it is actually cheaper to 
grant increased benefits with respect to all male members, than it is to determine which 
male members are in fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only 
to those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement” in order to 
survive strict scrutiny (emphasis added)). 
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abiding citizens.”165  Further, the court opined that 571.070.1(1) was narrowly 
tailored in that it “does not apply to misdemeanors, felony convictions that 
have been pardoned, or possession of antique firearms.”166  Because the State 
failed to show evidence indicating that a categorical and permanent restriction 
of firearm possession by felons actually increases public safety, the court 
should have held section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional. 
C.  The Rationale Behind and Implications of the Clay Decision 
Most laws do not survive under a strict scrutiny standard.167  But, a court 
striking down a restriction of the right to bear arms can result in substantial 
consequences that do not typically occur when other laws restricting funda-
mental rights are declared unconstitutional.  For example, had the Supreme 
Court of Missouri declared section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional, then all fel-
ons would have the legal ability to possess firearms until the Missouri legisla-
ture passed a law that was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
ment interest.168  But, the potentially unsettling aftermath of declaring section 
571.070.1(1) unconstitutional does not exempt the State from having to meet 
its burden, nor does it exempt the court from fulfilling its responsibility to strike 
down unconstitutional laws. 
 Because declaring 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional would have allowed 
all felons, including violent felons, to possess firearms for at least a short pe-
riod of time, the approach taken by the court was likely motivated by its desire 
to avoid this policy result.  But, this approach failed to embody the rigorous 
strict scrutiny standard.  As Justice Breyer predicted in his Heller dissent, this 
analysis was, in practice, akin to an interest-balancing inquiry, where the Court 
asked whether “the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent 
that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important 
governmental interests.”169  The finding that felons were more likely to commit 
 
 165. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
 166. Id. at 536. 
 167. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (“Overall, 
30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny – nearly one in three – result in the chal-
lenged law being upheld.”). 
 168. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 326 (2003) (stating that strict scrutiny 
requires a law to be narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest).  See 
also Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (stating that strict scrutiny requires a law to be “necessary to 
accomplish a compelling state interest”). 
 169. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).  In his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the adoption of a true strict 
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violent crimes than “other law abiding citizens” proved a compelling interest 
to restrict firearm possession by felons – an interest that is likely not overcome 
by its “burden” on the right to bear arms.170  Thus, while the State could not 
sufficiently prove that section 571.070.1(1) is narrowly tailored, it did convince 
the majority in Clay that the state’s compelling interest in public safety out-
weighs the right of felons to bear arms.171 
Despite the Heller majority’s explicit rejection of the interest-balancing 
test,172 analysis of the majority’s decision in State v. Clay indicates that the 
attempt to apply a high standard of scrutiny to a law restricting the right to bear 
arms may actually morph into an interest-balancing inquiry.173  On the other 
hand, had the Supreme Court of Missouri properly applied strict scrutiny, then, 
for the reasons outlined above, it would have found that the State failed to meet 
its burden because there was insufficient evidence showing that a permanent 
firearm ban for all felons was narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s 
public safety interest. 
By failing to properly apply strict scrutiny, the court defied the clear lan-
guage of the constitution, as well as its duty to declare the statute unconstitu-
tional.174  The court attempted to justify its upholding of section 571.070.1(1) 
under strict scrutiny by citing to its determination that Amendment 5 did not 
“substantially change” article I section 23.175  In their Dotson concurrences, 
both Judge Fischer and Judge Stith stated that the authors of Amendment 5, 
which included the Missourians Protecting the Second Amendment, merely 
 
[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in prac-
tice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the 
Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns 
on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermis-
sibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter. 
 
Id. 
 170. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 173. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 162, at 446–47 (“[T]he historical 
acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions cannot be explained by anything other than 
this very type of interest-balancing – an approach that does not require the kind of com-
pelling empirical evidence of necessity that the strict scrutiny test demands.”). 
 174. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to 
suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits 
assigned to their authority.  The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.”). 
 175. Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 536 (citing Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 190 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
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wanted to “ensure that the Missouri right to keep and bear arms remains coex-
tensive with the federal right explicated in Heller and McDonald.”176  But, the 
authors of Amendment 5 undoubtedly desired the greatest protection of the 
right to bear arms possible and recognized that the “strict scrutiny” language 
would increase the protection of the right.177  The Missourians Protecting the 
Second Amendment website notes that, prior to the addition of Amendment 5, 
Missouri’s right to bear arms provision was “deemed to only deserve a ‘rational 
basis’ or the lowest standard of review – virtually any rights-infringing law can 
pass this level of review.”178  Thus, with their approval of Amendment 5, Mis-
sourians called for the application of the most exacting standard of review for 
laws restricting the right to bear arms.179 
It seems, though, that the court had reason to fail to exercise the power 
given to them by the people.  First, as addressed above the court must have 
recognized that declaring section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional would, at least 
for a period of time, allow all felons to possess firearms, including those who 
committed the most violent crimes.  Further, in Scrutinizing the Second Amend-
ment, Adam Winkler notes that when courts apply a true strict scrutiny standard 
for laws restricting the right to bear arms, “legislatures may be hesitant to un-
dertake their duty to enhance public safety by regulating weapons out of fear 
that strict scrutiny will in fact be fatal.”180  He states, “Even if legislatures know 
that some laws survive Second Amendment strict scrutiny, the expected bene-
 
 176. Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 202 (Fischer, J., concurring); see also id. at 206–07 
(Stith, J., concurring) (noting that Amendment 5 “was not intended to change the cur-
rent state of the law regarding the right to carry or to regulate concealed weapons but 
was intended only to codify that law”).  The court seems to read Amendment 5 in a way 
that makes it pure surplusage.  Id. at 210.  This violates an important canon of statutory 
interpretation – the principle that each word in a statute is meaningful, and thus, “an 
interpretation that would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be 
rejected.”  Katharine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and 
Applying Statutes, WRITING CTR. AT GEO. U. L. CTR. 6 (Apr. 2006), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-schol-
arship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf.  See also Matthew Davis, 
Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2016) (“Ideally, 
‘every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute’ should be given effect.” (quot-
ing 801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc))). 
 177. MISSOURIANS PROTECTING 2ND AMEND., http://www.morkba.com/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2016) (encouraging constituents to support Amendment 5 because it 
“[a]dds ‘strict scrutiny’ which is the highest level of legal protection for a constitutional 
right”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Winkler, Scrutinizing, supra note 132, at 731. 
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fits of gun control would be discounted by the probability of judicial invalida-
tion.”181  The court avoids these potentially problematic implications by cir-
cumventing a true strict scrutiny application and declining to declare section 
571.070.1(1) unconstitutional.182 
The court’s faulty application of strict scrutiny is concerning.  Dotson and 
its progeny will undoubtedly serve as precedent for future challenges to laws 
restricting the right to bear arms in Missouri.  Thus, despite the language of the 
Missouri Constitution requiring laws restricting the right to bear arms to be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, the court will 
continue to uphold laws that in reality fail to meet this standard.  Possibly more 
concerning, it is probable that the court’s erroneous application of strict scru-
tiny to the right to bear arms may lead to the loose application of strict scrutiny 
to laws that undermine other fundamental rights.  Should this occur, laws lim-
iting fundamental rights will be upheld under the strict scrutiny standard 
merely because there is a compelling government interest,183 despite the state’s 
failure to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In State v. Clay, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared constitutional a 
law that prohibited felons from possessing firearms – a Second Amendment 
restriction that has historically been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, lower 
federal courts, and state courts.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in 
Clay differed from that of other courts, however, in that the Supreme Court of 
Missouri found this law constitutional, even under a strict scrutiny standard.  
While the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding is seemingly consistent with 
the intentions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Missouri legislature, it is ar-
guably inconsistent with the Missouri Constitution’s true meaning and the will 
of the people of Missouri.  In failing to properly apply strict scrutiny, the court 
evaded its duty to serve as a check on the legislative branch and strike down 
legislation that impinges upon the people’s constitutional rights.184 
To carry out the role demanded by the Framers185 and preserve the mean-
ing of the most exacting standard of constitutional review, the court should 
have properly applied strict scrutiny and declared section 571.070.1(1) uncon-
stitutional.  The court could have declared the law unconstitutional while also 
avoiding the potential problematic policy implications addressed above.  For 
example, in declaring section 571.070.1(1) unconstitutional, the court could 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 534–35 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 183. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 184. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to 
suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits 
assigned to their authority.  The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.”). 
 185. Id. 
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/14
2017] MISSED THE MARK 621 
have provided suggestions of laws that are narrowly tailored.  For instance, the 
Louisiana law at issue in State v. Eberhardt is as an example of a properly 
tailored felon-in-possession statute.186  Additionally, declaring the statute un-
constitutional “as applied” to Clay, a nonviolent felon, was another option for 
the court.  This would have avoided a facial declaration of unconstitutionality 
and preserved the restrictions on all felons until the Missouri legislature passed 
a new law.  These alternatives would have allowed the court to fulfill its duty 
under the constitution, while avoiding potential negative policy implications.  
Instead, the court chose an option that left unclear the proper application of the 
strict scrutiny standard to laws restricting the right to bear arms and ultimately 




 186. State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 381 (La. 2014). 
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